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LESSONS FROM IMPROVEMENTS IN MILITARY AND
OVERSEAS VOTING
Steven F. Huefner *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article, part of the symposium's "Get Out the Vote?" panel,
considers recent efforts to improve the voting experience of mili-
tary and overseas voters and identifies some broader implications
of those efforts on various early and absentee voting methods in-
creasingly available to other U.S. voters. A number of recent
measures to facilitate voting by military service personnel have
generally received widespread bipartisan support, with legisla-
tors quickly lining up to enhance the voting experience of those
who are putting their lives at risk to protect American security.'
These service personnel may be in a tent in Afghanistan on Elec-
tion Day or spending the entire election season at sea on a nucle-
ar submarine. They may even be stationed at their home precinct
on a military base in the United States but be subject to a poten-
tial deployment somewhere else, with little notice, in the days be-
fore an election and therefore wish to vote by absentee ballot in
advance.
Although no single accommodation best suits each of these cir-
cumstances, a combination of measures now in place has en-
hanced the voting opportunities for all military voters as well as
for overseas civilians.2 Meanwhile, some similar accommodations
* Professor of Law & Senior Fellow of Election Law @ Moritz, The Ohio State Uni-
versity Michael E. Moritz College of Law. J.D., 1991, Columbia University School of Law;
A.B., 1986, Harvard College. I am grateful for the research assistance of Kyle Hackett and
Timothy Watson.
1. See, e.g., John Cornyn, U.S. Sen., An Author's Assessment of the Effectiveness of
the MOVE Act, in HERITAGE LECTURES, Aug. 12, 2011, at 2 (describing a "bipartisan group
of Senators" responsible for MOVE Act).
2. An army private in a tent in Afghanistan might be best assisted through the elec-
tronic transmission of a blank ballot forty-five days before Election Day, as required by
federal law, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text, which the private could vote in
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also could enhance the voting experience of other voters in a
number of ways, including possibly alleviating long lines like
those that, as recently as the 2012 presidential election, contin-
ued to plague some voters at the polls on Election Day.3 In fact,
the Obama campaign successfully sued Ohio in 2012 to make ear-
ly voting opportunities for military voters available to all voters.4
Yet not all of the accommodations for the specialized circum-
stances of military and overseas voters will translate well to other
contexts.
Military and overseas voters have come to be known as
"UOCAVA voters" because of the federal law-the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act ("UOCAVA")5-that since
1986 has provided these voters with several key accommodations
for voting in federal elections. The desire to assist these UOCAVA
voters understandably is widespread, although it is not always
easy to agree upon the best ways to maximize their ability to par-
ticipate. Moreover, the extent to which these accommodations ac-
tually do help "get out the vote" is not yet clear, as witnessed by
concerns this year about low voting participation rates among
UOCAVA voters.6 Nevertheless, the desire to assist these voters
is strong. Moreover, the evolution of the voting processes used for
UOCAVA voters also has both direct and indirect implications for
efforts to improve the voting experience of other voters.
the tent without the need for a contemporaneous postmark, as the Uniform Law Commis-
sion's ("ULC's") proposed uniform state law would allow, see infra note 85 and accompany-
ing text. A navy ensign on a long-term submarine deployment might be better served by
voting a federal write-in absentee ballot, see infra note 62 and accompanying text, long
before regular absentee ballots would be available. A service member subject to an abrupt
deployment right before Election Day might be assisted by the final weekend of early in-
person voting that Ohio made available to military personnel in 2012. See infra notes 192-
200 and accompanying text. But this voter would derive even more meaningful assistance
from the provision in the ULC's proposed uniform state law that permits all military per-
sonnel, not just those who are absent from their home precinct, to use the military and
overseas voting process as their default, precisely to avoid the voting difficulties that can
arise in the case of a last-minute deployment. See infra note 202.
3. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, "We Have to Fix That," but Will We?, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2012, at A26 (quoting President Obama's 2012 victory speech).
4. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
6. See, e.g., MILITARY VOTER PROT. PROJECT, MILITARY VOTING UPDATE: A BLEAK
PICTURE IN 2012, at 1, 4 (2012); Military Ballot Requests Down in Key Battleground States,
FOXNEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/10/O1/miitary-ballot-re
quests-down-in-key-battleground-states/.
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Section II offers a brief overview of the history and status of ef-
forts to enable military personnel to vote, including the develop-
ment of UOCAVA and its recent amendment with the 2009 feder-
al Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment ("MOVE") Act.7
But long before these federal statutes, individual states had
adopted various accommodations for military voters, which
helped to pave the way for other absentee voter measures. Since
2010, the Uniform Law Commission's ("ULC") state-level Uniform
Military and Overseas Voters Act ("UMOVA") s also has offered an
approach that helps states to comply with federal law, while also
extending comparable protections to all state elections and to a
wider class of military and overseas voters, and while enhancing
nationwide uniformity in the processes by which military and
overseas voters participate in elections.
Section III uses three recent "controversies" in UOCAVA voting
to explore how these voting accommodations can work in practice,
and to highlight their connections to the larger field of election
administration. The first controversy concerns the impact of mili-
tary and overseas voting on the outcome of the 2000 presidential
election in Florida.9 The second involves Virginia's difficulties
transmitting and processing UOCAVA ballots in 2008, which led
to litigation and a federal consent decree concerning the state's
compliance with the requirements of the UOCAVA statute." The
third is the Obama campaign's 2012 federal suit over Ohio's early
voting rules that provided UOCAVA voters with three additional
days of early in-person voting not available to non-UOCAVA vot-
ers, a lawsuit that generated complaints from many military and
veterans groups that the Obama campaign was seeking to deprive
UOCAVA voters of their protections.1"
Drawing upon these three recent controversies over accommo-
dations for military and overseas voters, Section IV then con-
cludes with some broader reflections about early and absentee
7. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§
575-89, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318-35 (2009).
8. See Military and Overseas Voters Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.un
iformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Military and Overseas Voters Act (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
The ULC is formally titled the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. See About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.
aspx?title=About the ULC (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
9. See infra notes 92-128 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 129-58 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 159-220 and accompanying text.
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voting generally. Although this section remains cautious about
the desirability of extensive "convenience" voting in the form of
absentee voting open to all voters, it offers some proposed best
approaches for implementing both absentee and early voting. It
also encourages states that have not done so to consider adopting
UMOVA, in order to promote greater uniformity in UOCAVA vot-
ing in all U.S. elections.
At the outset, I want to note two aspects of the perspective
from which I write. First, I come to these issues with the experi-
ence of having served as the reporter for the ULC drafting com-
mittee that, between 2008 and 2010, developed UMOVA. The
commission, which had not previously tackled an election law top-
ic, took up a project focused only on military and overseas voting
in 2008 in part because it saw the project as unlikely to generate
strong partisan conflicts. Understanding the points of agreement
that emerged from this uniform law project for military and over-
seas voters also will help explain more about the changing land-
scape of absentee and early voting generally. Meanwhile, in 2011
the American Law Institute also commenced an election law pro-
ject, focused on the two relatively less partisan topics of post-
election dispute resolution and nontraditional voting processes. I
have the pleasure of serving as the associate reporter on this pro-
ject, along with the principal reporter, my Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law colleague Ned Foley. Of course, the opin-
ions and conclusions in this article are entirely my own and not
those of the ULC, the American Law Institute, or Professor Foley.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF UOCAVA VOTING
Although absentee voting may seem to be a fundamental part
of modern elections, it has not always been available. The rise of
absentee voting for the American public is related to the evolution
of absentee voting for military service members, beginning with
the Civil War and renewed by World War I. Additional efforts to
enfranchise military and overseas voters occurred during World
War II and the Korean War, though UOCAVA itself was not en-
acted until 1986.12 Today, improvements developed initially for
military voters continue to influence methods of convenience vot-
ing generally.
12. Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986).
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A. From the Civil War through World War I
Although limited absentee voting apparently was occurring in
New England in the seventeenth century," the Civil War brought
the first widespread use of absentee voting. The 1864 presidential
election was the first national election any nation had ever con-
ducted in the middle of a civil war,14 and more than 10% of the
voting population was serving in the armed services during the
conflict. 5 Moreover, Republicans were interested in capturing as
many votes as possible from Union troops, who overwhelmingly
favored President Lincoln's re-election bid. 6 Immediately prior to
the Civil War, only one state-Pennsylvania-had provisions that
permitted absent servicemen to vote,"' but by 1864 nineteen of
twenty-five Union states, and seven of eleven Confederate states,
had implemented some means of allowing their soldiers to vote
away from their home polling place. 8 The move to permit absen-
tee military voting was not uncontroversial, however, creating a
partisan divide in some places 9 and, in other places, necessitating
that states first amend provisions in their state constitutions
that, essentially as an anti-fraud measure, required voting to oc-
cur in-person."
Notwithstanding the concerns about fraud, two principal meth-
ods of absentee voting were deployed for Civil War soldiers. One
involved creating battlefield polling locations, an option made
easier by the organization of the Union army into state regi-
13. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 121 (2009 ed., 2000).
14. See Donna Miles, Servicemembers to Follow Long Absentee Voting Tradition, U.S.
DEP'T OF DEF. (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle. aspx?ID=51200;
R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall & Brian F. Roberts, Military Voting and the Law: Proce-
dural and Technological Solutions to The Ballot Transit Problem 11 (Voting Tech. Project,
Working Paper No. 53, 2007), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/sites/default/files/
vtp.wp53.pdf.
15. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14.
16. See JOHN C. FORTIER, ABSENTEE & EARLY VOTING: TRENDS, PROMISES, AND PERILS
7-8 (2006); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Bal-
lot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 494 (2003).
17. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 497; see generally Jonathan W. White,
Canvassing the Troops: The Federal Government and the Soldiers' Right to Vote, 50 CIV.
WAR HIST. 291, 291 (2004).
18. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 493 (citing JOSIAM HENRY BENTON,
VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL WAR 312-15 (priv. print
1915)).
19. See Donald S. Inbody, Political Barriers to Military Voting: A Brief Historical
Overview, OVERSEAS VOTE FOUND'N RES. NEWSL., May-June 2010, at 1.
20. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 494-500.
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ments.2 Under this method, soldiers in the field would cast their
ballot into a ballot box under the eyes of supervising officers, and
when voting was finished, the box would be secured and trans-
ported back to the home state, where its contents would be count-
ed.22 The second method involved allowing soldiers to designate a
proxy, who could vote on the soldier's behalf in the soldier's home
jurisdiction.23 Both methods were vulnerable to fraud, however,
whether because the proxy misrepresented the soldier's prefer-
ences or otherwise abused the soldier's trust or because the sol-
dier was coerced by military authority to vote in a particular
way.24 In addition, in at least one New York case, election officials
were charged with forging soldiers' names on ballots. 5
At the time of the Civil War, the "Australian" or secret ballot
was not yet in use in the United States. 26 As a result, even regular
voting was also easily vulnerable to fraud and coercion.27 In the
decades after the Civil War, most states turned their attention
towards adopting the Australian ballot, while absentee voting re-
ceived comparably little attention.28 A few states adopted new ab-
sentee voting laws for military during the Spanish-American war,
but in many other places military voting rights lapsed until
World War 1.29 Even then, little was done to accommodate mili-
tary voters who were overseas, for whom the round-trip transit
time for absentee ballots essentially made voting impossible with-
in the period of the typical absentee voting window, which was
usually thirty days or less. °
Notably, the widespread adoption of the (secret) Australian bal-
lot was in tension with the generous use of the (not-secret) absen-
tee ballot.3 Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century many
21. See id. at 492.
22. See id. at 500 (citing BENTON, supra note 18, at 15, 54).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 494-95.
25. See id. at 496 (citing BENTON, supra note 18, at 160).
26. See KEYSSAR, supra note 13, at 115.
27. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 489-90.
28. See id. at 490-91, 501.
29. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 8; Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 504-05
(citing Paul G. Steinbicker, Absentee Voting in the United States, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
898, 898-99 (1938)).
30. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining that Congress con-
sidered but failed to adopt legislation that would have offered some assistance to overseas
military personnel during World War I).
31. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 8-11.
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states began expanding absentee voting to non-military voters; by
World War II most states also permitted some amount of civilian
absentee voting. 32 Having recognized the value of allowing absent
soldiers to participate in elections, it was a natural move for
states to allow others who were excusably absent from their vot-
ing jurisdiction on Election Day to do the same. Indeed, one early
twentieth century reformer opined that the Industrial Revolution
had produced an economic system that, much like military con-
scription, removed voters, "through no fault of their own,... from
their places in the body politic and deprived [them] of their right-
ful votes.33 However, in order to provide some protection against
absentee ballot fraud, typical state statutes permitted absentee
balloting only for the limited class of voters unable to reach the
polls on Election Day and required that an absentee voter cast
the ballot in the presence of a notary who could validate the vot-
er's affirmation that the vote was not coerced.34 Still, an increas-
ingly transient society was increasingly interested in alternatives
to in-precinct Election Day voting for both military and civilian
voters who were away from home.
B. From World War II Through the Vietnam Era
World War II witnessed substantial additional attention to the
voting difficulties facing American military personnel, especially
those stationed overseas. In the early months of the war, Con-
gress took up legislation that would become the Soldier Voting
Act of 1942, 35 the first federal guarantee of a right to vote for
American military, which applied only to federal elections and on-
ly during wartime.36 It excused military members from any state
poll taxes, allowed them to vote even if they were not previously
registered, and permitted them to request an "official war ballot"
from their home state, using a postcard distributed to them by
32. See id. at 10-11; Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 504.
33. KEYSSAR, supra note 13, at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3
DEBATES IN THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1917-1918, at 12 (1920)
(statement of Chmn. Knotts)).
34. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 10-11; Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 16, at 502-
06.
35. Pub. L. No. 77-712, 56 Stat. 753.
36. See KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE UNIFORMED AND
OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 1 (2012).
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the Department of War.37 The federal government then offered to
reimburse states for the costs associated with providing war bal-
lots to military voters. 38 The measure was enacted too late to have
more than a modest impact on the 1942 midterm congressional
elections, but a revised measure enacted in anticipation of the
1944 presidential election is credited with allowing close to three
million military personnel to vote.39
However, the 1944 law was in some ways weaker than the
1942 law, reflecting the fact that partisan considerations were af-
fecting even the effort to assist military voters. For instance, un-
like its predecessor, the 1944 version replaced most of the manda-
tory provisions of the 1942 act with "recommendations" that
states facilitate military voting.40 Northern Democrats had sup-
ported a provision that would have created for the first time a
"federal war ballot," prepared and distributed by the federal gov-
ernment, that military voters could use if the state's own absen-
tee ballot did not reach the voter in time. 41 But Republicans and
Southern Democrats would only support a weaker measure,
which gave each state the power to decide whether to accept the
federal war ballot. Perhaps spurred in part by the congressional
activity, many states also amended their own absentee voting
laws to further facilitate military voting, at least during wartime,
41
consistent with their own election processes.
After the war ended, if anything, the voting opportunities of
the American military initially grew more restricted as some
states imposed additional hurdles.4 In 1952, during the Korean
War, President Truman therefore urged Congress to do more to
help military voters, specifically pressing for passage of a tempo-
rary federal law for the presidential election that year, which
would then be followed by permanent state laws in time for the
37. See id.; Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 18; see generally KEYSSAR, su-
pra note 13, at 197.
38. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 18 (quoting Pub. L. No. 77-712, §
10(a), 56 Stat. at 756).
39. See id. at 19-21.
40. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1. Compare 56 Stat. at 753, with Act of April 1,
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-277, 58 Stat. 136.
41. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 19-20.
42. See id. at 20.
43. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 11.
44. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 22.
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1954 congressional midterms.45 Congress did not act until three
years later, however, when it adopted the Federal Voting Assis-
tance Act of 1955.46 This measure recommended, but did not re-
quire, that states permit absentee voter registration for military
personnel in addition to absentee voting; that these opportunities
be available not only to absent active duty military but also to ci-
vilian employees of the federal government abroad and to other
civilian citizens involved in the military effort; and that they ap-
ply whether or not the country was formally at war.47
By the early 1960s, those few remaining states that had not
previously adopted some form of civilian absentee voting did so."
Meanwhile, the near universal suffrage theoretically guaranteed
by the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 helped ease parti-
san battles over congressional efforts to assist military voters. 9 In
1968, Congress amended the Voting Assistance Act to extend its
recommended accommodations to cover all U.S. citizens living
abroad." Many such citizens, however, could not meet state resi-
dency requirements that were prerequisites for absentee voting in
a particular state.51 Seven years later, Congress passed the Over-
seas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, which gave U.S. citizens
living abroad the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal elec-
tions, even if they no longer met state residency requirements, by
allowing them to treat their last U.S. domicile before departing
the country as their voting jurisdiction.52 Accompanying these ex-
pansions, the major political parties began courting overseas and
military voters more systematically, and the military appointed
voting assistance officers all around the globe to help deployed
53troops vote.
Yet as the Vietnam era ended, the processes by which overseas
and military voters could exercise these rights remained prob-
45. See Letter from Harry S. Truman, President, to Congress (Mar. 28, 1952), in
VOTING IN THE ARMED FORCES, H.R. DOc. No. 82-407, at iii-iv (1952).
46. Pub. L. No. 84-296, 69 Stat. 584.
47. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1.
48. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 12.
49. See ALVAREZ, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 26.
50. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1.
51. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIV. RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SUMMARY AND TEXT 6
(1971).
52. See COLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1.
53. See Alvarez, Hall & Roberts, supra note 14, at 25.
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lematic for many of them.54 One commonly cited problem involved
the mail service, with many ballots either arriving too late or not
at all.5 Another timing problem resulted from the fact that many
states normally did not print their ballots until shortly before the
election.56
C. UOCAVA of 1986
In 1986, building on the Overseas Voting Rights Act of 1975
and the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, Congress enacted
UOCAVA.57 In part, the measure was intended to consolidate ex-
isting protections for military and overseas voters and eliminate
obsolete and conflicting provisions." More importantly, it was in-
tended to provide these voters with additional assistance.59
Specifically, UOCAVA ensured that active duty members of the
U.S. military and their dependents who were absent from their
voting jurisdiction because of military service, and U.S. citizens
living abroad, had the right to vote by absentee ballot in federal
elections in their home state or the state in which they were last
domiciled before going abroad. 0 Building on its predecessors,
UOCAVA urged states to accept a federal post card application,
which UOCAVA voters were allowed to use both to register to
vote in their home state and simultaneously to request an absen-
tee ballot.6 ' UOCAVA also established a new federal ballot, called
the federal write-in absentee ballot, to be used as an emergency
back-up in the event that voters covered by UOCAVA had applied
for, but not received, their state's regular military ballot.62
UOCAVA also tasked a "Presidential Designee" with certain ad-
54. See id. at 28.
55. E.g., 132 CONG. REC. S7190 (daily ed. June 10, 1986) (statement of Sen. John
Warner).
56. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting. Hearing on H.R. 4393 Held Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Elections, 99th Cong. 12 (1986) (statement of Rep. Allan Swift,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Elections).
57. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100
Stat. 924 (1986).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 765, at 1, 5, 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2009,
2011.
59. See id. at 5, 7.
60. §§ 102, 107, 100 Stat. at 925, 927-28.
61. Id. §§ 101, 104, 100 Stat. at 924, 926.
62. Id. § 103, 100 Stat. at 925-26.
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ministrative responsibilities.63 President Reagan designated the
Secretary of Defense as the Presidential Designee, and most of
the duties were assigned to the Federal Voting Assistance Pro-
gram ("FVAP") within the Department of Defense.64
But some two decades after its enactment, UOCAVA still had
not solved the most critical problem facing overseas voters: the
need for more time to request, receive, vote, and return an absen-
tee ballot before the state deadlines.65 UOCAVA imposed no spe-
cific timeframe for transmitting ballots, and state practices varied
widely.66 In addition, in election after election, many UOCAVA
voters never even received balloting materials because of bad ad-
dresses, frequent relocations, and other mail delivery problems.
Even those voters who did receive a ballot in time to cast and re-
turn it before the state deadline might sometimes encounter diffi-
culties in finding an official to notarize the ballot, or otherwise in
executing it.6"
As a result, one estimate of voting participation rates in 2008
concluded that only about 30% of eligible military voters had cast
a valid ballot, compared to an overall nationwide turnout rate
that year of over 60%.69 These figures were an improvement over
figures from 2006 (a year not directly comparable to 2008 because
it was not a presidential election year), when military voter turn-
out was estimated at about 20%, again roughly half of the 40%
overall nationwide turnout that year." Although one recent study
that controlled for the demographic facts that the military popu-
lation tends to be younger and more male than the overall voting
63. Id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 924.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,642, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,975 (June 8, 1988).
65. See OVERSEAS VOTE FOUND'N, 2008 OVF POST ELECTION UOCAVA SURVEY
REPORT & ANALYSIS 15-22 (2009); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, No TIME TO VOTE:
CHALLENGES FACING AMERICA'S OVERSEAS MILITARY VOTERS 1-5 (2009) [hereinafter No
TIME TO VOTE].
66. See NO TIME TO VOTE, supra note 65, at 1.
67. See ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REGISTERING MILITARY AND
OVERSEAS CITIZENS TO VOTE 6-7 (2009).
68. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, MAKING THE ELECTION SYSTEM WORK FOR
MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS 3 (2009) [hereinafter MAKING THE ELECTION SYSTEM
WORK].
69. Compare ERIC EVERSOLE, MILITARY VOTER PROTECTION PROJECT, MILITARY
VOTING IN 2010: A STEP FORWARD, BUT A LONG WAY TO Go 2 & n.7 (2012), with 2008 Gen-
eral Election Turnout Rates, GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Mar. 31, 2012), http://elections.gmu.
edulTurnout_2008G.html.
70. See SKAGGS, supra note 67, at 1-2; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, MILITARY AND
OVERSEAS CITIZEN VOTING PROJECT 1 (2008).
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age population found much less disparity between military turn-
out and overall turnout, military turnout was still lower despite a
higher voter registration rate among the military population.7
D. Recent State and Federal Legislation: UMOVA and MOVE
In 2008, encouraged by the Pew Center on the States, as well
as the Alliance for Military and Overseas Voting Rights, the
Overseas Vote Foundation, the FVAP, and other military and
voter advocacy groups, the ULC undertook a project to develop a
uniform state law that would standardize and improve the voting
options available to military and overseas voters.72 One reflection
of the pressing need for increased standardization was the fact
that FVAP's Voting Assistance Guide, relied on by military voting
assistance officers throughout the world, had grown to over 400
pages in length.73 After a two-year drafting process, the result of
this ULC effort was UMOVA. 4 In the first two years since
UMOVA's promulgation, ten states (including three states with
large military populations, California, Virginia, and North Caro-
lina) and the District of Columbia have enacted some version of
UMOVA.
75
For the first year of the UMOVA drafting process, it seemed
likely that the act's most important contributions would be (1) its
specification of a substantial time period well before an election
by which time an adopting state must have transmitted an ab-
sentee ballot to a voter covered by the Act and (2) a requirement
that the state transmit this ballot to the voter electronically, if
requested by the voter.76 The drafters also considered a variety of
71. FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2010 POST ELECTION SURVEY REPORT TO
CONGRESS ii, 11-14 (2011).
72. Press Release, Uniform Law Commission, New Act Designed to Help Military and
Overseas Voters (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/
UMOVA Press Release 7-30-10.doc.
73. See FED. VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, supra note 71, at 42.
74. See Steven F. Huefner, Commentary, Protecting the Voting Rights of Military and
Overseas Voters, ELECTION LAW & MORITZ (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.uni
formlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Huefner Article Moritz 9-21-10.pdf.
75. Adopting States have not always adopted all of UMOVA's provisions. See Military
and Overseas Voters Act, supra note 8. Compare UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT
§ 13, 13 U.L.A. 88 (Supp. 2012), with Act of Mar. 25, 2011, ch. 327, 2011 Utah Laws 1830.
76. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT, § 9(a), (b), 13 U.L.A. 86 (Supp. 2012). In
the early stages of the drafting process, the drafting committee also considered including a
provision in UMOVA permitting electronic transmission of a voted ballot but ultimately
concluded that security concerns, whether real or perceived, made electronic voting too
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possible definitions of the class of covered voters, ultimately de-
ciding to broaden the coverage beyond that offered by UOCAVA
to include active-duty military personnel who were not absent
from their voting residence and also to include the relatively
small number of U.S. citizens born abroad who have never had a
direct tie to any of the fifty states." Of course, as a state law,
UMOVA also was able to extend its coverage to all state elec-
tions-another way in which it provided a broader scope of cover-
age than that provided by UOCAVA, which by its terms applied
to elections for federal office.78
The potential impact of UMOVA changed midstream, however,
when Congress in 2009 took up its own measure to improve the
voting opportunities of UOCAVA voters. This measure, the
MOVE Act, amended UOCAVA to impose for the first time in fed-
eral law a specific deadline, forty-five days before Election Day,
by which time states were required to transmit absentee ballots
to UOCAVA voters and establish the ability to send these ballots
to voters electronically,79 much as the developing UMOVA was be-
ing drafted to require." The federal MOVE Act also prohibited
states from imposing a notarization requirement on UOCAVA
ballots.8' The measure allowed states to seek a waiver of the forty-
controversial to include in this uniform state law. Nevertheless, more than half the states
have begun implementing pilot projects or limited electronic ballot casting methods for
their UOCAVA voters. See Ian Urbina, States Move to Allow Overseas and Military Voters
to Cast Ballots by Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A18.
77. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT, § 2(1)(E) & cmt., 13 U.L.A. 79-81
(Supp. 2012).
78. Id. § 3 & cmt., 13 U.L.A_ 81 (Supp. 2012). If only for administrative convenience,
many states already extended UOCAVA's protections to all state elections held in conjunc-
tion with a federal election. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-8.3-103 (2011); CARRIE KURUC,
OFFICE OF OHIO SEC'Y OF STATE, UOCAVA VOTING (2012); COLO. DEP'T OF STATE,
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE (July 29, 2011); Terrance
Adams, OLR Research Report: Electronic Ballot Submission By Military and Overseas Vot-
ers, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.
cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-0022.htm; Voting for Military and Overseas U.S. Citizens,
OFFICE OF SEC'Y OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ELE/elemil
/milidx.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). But this extension was not legally required, see
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/activ-uoc.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2013), and many
states with state and local elections held independently of federal elections offered no ac-
commodations for UOCAVA voters. See, e.g., Fischer v. Stout, 741 F.2d 217, 222 (Alaska
1987).
79. Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 578-79, 123 Stat. 2190, 2321-22 (2009) (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff -1(a)(7), (8) (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
80. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT, § 9, 13 U.L.A. 86 (Supp. 2012).
81. § 582(a)(i)(1), 123 Stat. at 2327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(i)(1)).
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five-day transmission deadline, on an election-by-election basis, if
a state could demonstrate a hardship and had an acceptable al-
ternative for protecting the voting opportunities of its UOCAVA
voters.82 But the MOVE Act, as a new federal requirement, forced
states' hands (at least for federal elections) in a way that the
UMOVA, as a ULC proposal that each state was free to adopt or
ignore, could not have. Some states even had to move their pri-
mary election earlier in the fall in order to be able to prepare gen-
eral election absentee ballots in time to meet the MOVE Act's for-
ty-five-day ballot transmission deadline.83
After the MOVE Act's adoption, UMOVA then became most
important for its broadened scope-in terms of both its coverage
of state elections and its coverage of a wider category of covered
voters"-and for its adoption of various other more modest ac-
commodations. These included letting covered voters submit an
absentee ballot without either a postmark or a witness, as long as
the voter affirmed the ballot's validity and timeliness under pen-
alty of perjury; 5 letting these ballots be received after Election
Day, up through the day before the relevant jurisdiction's local
canvass deadline, as long as the voter affirmed under penalty of
perjury that the ballot had been cast before 12:01 a.m. on Election
Day; 6 and giving covered voters a private right of action to seek
equitable relief for violations of its provisions."
Because the ULC promulgated the final version of UMOVA on
September 30, 2010, no state was able to adopt it before the No-
vember 2010 federal midterm elections.8 However, the 2010 elec-
tions were subject to the federal MOVE Act's forty-five-day ballot
transmission requirement. 9 Eleven states, two territories, and
82. Id. § 579(a), 123 Stat. at 2322-23 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-
1(g)(1), (2)).
83. See, e.g., Tim Craig, Questions on Minds of Voters: Already?, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,
2012, at B01; Thomas Kaplan, June Primary Date in Congress Races, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2012, at A24.
84. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
85. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT, §§ 12(b), 13, 13 U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 2012).
86. Id. §§ 10, 12(a), 13 U.L.A. 86-87 (Supp. 2012).
87. Id. § 18, 13 U.L.A. 90 (Supp. 2012).
88. Utah became the first state to adopt UMOVA in March 2011. See Act of Mar. 25,
2011, ch. 327, 2011 Utah Laws 1812; Press Release, Uniform Law Commission, Utah First
State to Enact Important New Law Designed to Help Military and Overseas Voters (Mar.
28, 2011), available at www.uniformlaws.orgfNewsDetail.aspx?title=Utah First State to
Enact Uniform Military and Overseas Voters Act.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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the District of Columbia were not able to meet this requirement
that year,9 but even with thirty-six states meeting the require-
ment, one 2010 study reported that only 4.6% of America's two
million military voters cast a counted ballot in 2010 (from among
the 15.8% of these voters who requested a ballot that year).9 Two
significant concerns therefore remained for future elections: that
a sizable portion of potential UOCAVA voters do not even manage
to apply for a ballot and that a substantial portion of those who
do are nevertheless not able to successfully complete and return
it in time.
In a close election, these missing votes certainly have the po-
tential to make a difference. Indeed, as Section III discusses, con-
troversies in three of the last four presidential elections confirm
the importance of the effort to "Get Out the Vote" with respect to
military and overseas citizens. Section IV will then consider ways
to continue to improve the voting processes, both for UOCAVA
voters and for other absentee and early voters.
III. RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN UOCAVA VOTING: THREE TALES
FROM PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES
It will help to understand the impact of current state and fed-
eral accommodations for military and overseas voters to consider
them not only in terms of what the key features of these accom-
modations require on paper, but also in terms of how these provi-
sions have shaped campaign outcomes and strategy on the
ground in recent elections. Though it is now largely a forgotten
memory, the outcome of the 2000 presidential election in Florida
in fact was determined by Florida's acceptance of late-arriving
UOCAVA ballots. Given this fact, in 2008 it therefore was under-
standable for the McCain campaign to believe that UOCAVA vot-
ing could again be outcome determinative, at least in swing states
with large military populations like Virginia. The campaign's
identification of problems with Virginia's UOCAVA balloting ac-
cordingly led the campaign to sue the Commonwealth the day be-
fore Election Day to protect the votes of military voters. Most re-
90. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNIFORMED AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2010).
91. EVERSOLE, supra note 69, at 4-5. Comparable figures for 2006 were 5.5% and
16.5%. Id. As of the drafting this article, data about UMOVA voter participation in the
November 2012 election were not yet available.
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cently, in 2012 the Obama campaign used to broader advantage a
seemingly accidental feature of a convoluted Ohio scheme that
permitted only UOCAVA voters to use early in-person voting on
the three days immediately before Election Day. The campaign
successfully argued in federal court that all Ohio voters should be
able to take advantage of these opportunities. Each of these three
recent UOCAVA election controversies not only clarifies
UOCAVA voting practices but also sheds light on early and ab-
sentee voting processes generally.
A. Florida 2000
It is a relatively under studied92 and not frequently acknowl-
edged93 fact of the 2000 presidential election that overseas ballots
arriving after Election Day were necessary for George W. Bush's
ultimate 537-vote margin of victory in Florida. Unofficial Election
Night returns showed Bush to be ahead in Florida by almost 1800
votes over Al Gore, his Democratic opponent.94 But official results,
after local canvassing and partial recounts, showed that out of all
the valid Florida ballots cast and received by the end of Election
Day, Gore actually received 202 more votes than Bush.99 Why
then did Bush win Florida's twenty-five presidential electors? Be-
cause the state's final official count also included almost 2500 ad-
ditional votes that arrived from overseas after Election Day, 1575
of which were for Bush and 836 of which were for Gore.96 Bush
thus had a net advantage of 739 votes from these late-arriving
overseas ballots, more than enough to offset his 202-vote deficit in
92. The best accounts are Kosuke Imai & Gary King, Did Illegal Overseas Absentee
Ballots Decide the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election?, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 537 (2004); Diane H.
Mazur, The Bullying of America: A Cautionary Tale about Military Voting and Civil-
Military Relations, 4 ELECTION L.J. 105 (2005); David Barstow & Don van Natta, Jr., Ex-
amining the Vote; How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2001, at Al.
93. Cf. Mazur, supra note 92, at 105 ("[N]o legal writer has ever made more than a
passing reference to the issues of military voting that dominated the 2000 election crisis
for weeks.").
94. Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92.
95. Imai & King, supra note 92, at 537. The official totals of Florida votes cast by the
close of the polls were 2,911,417 votes for Gore to 2,911,215 votes for Bush. Id. at 538; see
Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92.
96. Imai & King, supra note 92, at 538. A total of 3704 overseas ballots arrived after
Election Day, see Mazur, supra note 92, at 105, only 2490 of which (about two-thirds) were
counted, see Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92.
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the official count of those votes cast by the close of the polls on
Election Day.97
Florida counted these late-arriving overseas ballots because of
a consent decree resulting from a 1982 federal lawsuit brought
against Florida by the U.S. Department of Justice, alleging that
Florida's late primary election date left insufficient time for mili-
tary voters and overseas civilians to exercise their voting rights
as then protected by the Federal Voting Assistance Act and the
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act.9" Florida, of course, has a
substantial number of military voters, given the presence of ma-
jor Air Force and Navy bases in the state.99 The lawsuit was set-
tled with an agreement that, in the 1982 midterm elections, Flor-
ida would accept ballots from these voters until ten days after
Election Day, provided that the ballots were postmarked by Elec-
tion Day and provided that thereafter Florida, presumably
through its legislature, would develop a permanent response for
subsequent federal elections.' 0 When the legislature would not
move the state's primary elections, in 1984 the Florida secretary
of state asked the court instead to approve an administrative rule
that permanently continued the ten-day post-election window for
the receipt of all overseas absentee ballots, provided the ballots
bore either a postmark or the voter's signature dated on or before
Election Day.1
In 2000, Florida somewhat curiously was continuing its prac-
tice of accepting late-arriving overseas ballots, even though in
1989 the state legislature had enacted a new provision that re-
quired counties to send advance ballots to UOCAVA voters at
least forty-five days before a general election (the same period
that the MOVE Act would incorporate two decades later), a fix
that would have satisfied the federal court in 1984 and alleviated
the need to accept late-arriving ballots."2 Also in 1989, the legis-
97. Imai & King, supra note 92, at 538.
98. See Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321-22
(N.D. Fla. 2000); Mazur, supra note 92, at 112.
99. See DEP'T OF DEF., DOD MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BY STATE-SEPTEMBER
30, 2009 at 11 (2009).
100. See Harris, 122 F. Supp. at 1322; Mazur, supra note 92, at 112-13.
101. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 113.
102. See id. at 114 (citing Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 338, 1989 Fla. Laws 2139). The ad-
vent of the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot as part of UOCAVA in 1986 also completely
altered the terrain on which the 1982 consent decree had been written. Florida's adoption
of its own "advance" ballot in 1989 was a refinement of the relatively new federal require-
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lature added a requirement that "only those ballots mailed with
an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark shall be considered valid"
overseas ballots °3 and preserved a provision requiring that all ab-
sentee ballots be received by 7:00 p.m. on Election Day.1 0 4 Yet the
local practice thereafter in Florida continued to be to follow the
1984 administrative rule and accept late-arriving overseas ballots
as long as they bore the required postmark. °10
But in the early aftermath of Election Day 2000, Florida's sec-
retary of state issued a problematic statement indicating that
although overseas ballots must have been "executed" as of Elec-
tion Day, "[tlhey are not required. . . to be postmarked on or prior
to [Election Day]."1°6 As a result, while some counties continued to
require a timely postmark, others departed from this long-
standing practice."' To some observers, the result was that many
Florida counties may have accepted some overseas ballots that
likely were cast after Election Day, contrary to Florida law.' ° An-
ecdotal reports confirmed that some military voters had complet-
ed their absentee ballot only after Election Day, once the added
importance of their vote was apparent. 9
Largely as a political matter, however, initial controversy over
the possibility that Florida's acceptance of late-arriving overseas
ballots was an invitation to unlawful voting eventually gave way
to expressions of the desirability of enfranchising as many mili-
tary voters as possible. 10 Most famously, Gore's running mate,
ment.
103. Act of July 5, 1989, 1989 Fla. Laws at 2157-60. The foreign or military postmarks
would enable election officials to confirm that the voter was a UOCAVA voter and thus
eligible to cast an advance ballot or federal write-in absentee ballot and to continue to vote
in Florida even if the voter no longer met the Florida residency requirement. See Mazur,
supra note 92, at 114-15.
104. See Act of July 5, 1989, 1989 Fla. Laws at 2159-60 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 101.67(2) (2008)).
105. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 107.
106. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Statement of Katherine Harris, Secretary of
State (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/fll 1- 14deadline.pdf).
107. See Richard Perez-Pena, Counting the Vote: The Overseas Ballots, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2000, at All.
108. See Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92.
109. See id.
110. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 108-10. This was true even though the number of
overseas ballots arriving late suddenly increased approximately seven to ten days after
Election Day, contrary to what arguably would be the expected pattern of declining num-
bers of overseas ballots with each passing day after the election. See id. at 119-21. One
subsequent study concluded that of the late-arriving ballots that ultimately were included
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vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman, declared on a
Sunday morning talk show twelve days after the election that
Florida election officials should reconsider rejected overseas bal-
lots "even if they might not comply with the law" and "give the
benefit of the doubt to ballots coming in from military person-
nel." '111 Gore also reportedly said privately that "[ilf I won this
thing by a handful of military ballots, I would be hounded by Re-
publicans and the press every day of my presidency and it
wouldn't be worth having."'
12
Meanwhile, the Bush campaign continued to press for the in-
clusion of as many late-arriving overseas votes as possible. On
November 22, Bush filed a state lawsuit asking that election offi-
cials in counties that had not done so count even those overseas
ballots that bore a late postmark (or no postmark)." 3 Three days
later, after the circuit court judge suggested at a hearing that the
lawful remedy might be to invalidate all late-arriving absentee
ballots, as the judge apparently read the Florida statutes to re-
quire, Bush withdrew the suit."4 The next day, he filed a new ac-
tion seeking similar relief in federal district court,"' and similar
state court suits in five other Florida counties. 6 But by then,
many of the counties were already reconsidering previously re-
jected ballots under more lenient standards."'
To some observers, the effort to count as many of these late bal-
lots as possible may have heralded the triumph of a "substantial
compliance" standard over a strict compliance standard"' with
in the official Florida results, 680 of them were "questionable." Barstow & van Natta, su-
pra note 92.
111. Richard Perez-Pena, Counting the Vote: The Absentee Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2012, at A5 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Richard L. Berke, Examining the Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at A16.
112. See Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11, Bush v. Bay Cnty. Canvass-
ing Bd., No. 00-2799 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2000).
114. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 110 (citing Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Bay
Cnty. Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2799 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2000)).
115. Complaint at 13-14, Bush v. Hillsborough Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d
1305 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 3:00CV533-LAC).
116. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 111.
117. See id.
118. For discussions on strict versus substantial compliance in election law, see Ed-
ward B. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v. Franken, 10 ELECTION
L.J. 187, 216-18 (2011); Edward B. Foley, The Lake Wobegone Recount: Minnesota's Dis-
puted 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129, 142 (2011) [hereinafter The Lake
Wobegone Recount]; Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 85-87
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
respect to Florida's overseas ballot requirements, thereby enfran-
chising a larger group of eligible voters."9 Indeed, there is little
evidence that very many of the late ballots were cast by ineligible
voters or deliberately cast fraudulently. 120 But to other observers,
the fact that many of these ballots-680 of those counted, by one
analysis121-may have been unlawfully voted after the polls closed
meant that their inclusion in the official results was an example
of fundamental noncompliance with the standards, rather than of
substantial compliance, thereby calling the legitimacy of the out-
come into question. 12 To these observers, election officials count-
ing these ballots failed in their duties by disregarding sound elec-
tion procedures in favor of untenable legal arguments-and
public bullying-on behalf of the politically popular cause of en-
franchising the military.
12
Those observers concerned about Florida's failure to follow its
overseas ballot rules remind us that, even assuming that all the
late ballots were cast by voters who were theoretically eligible to
vote and had legitimately received an absentee ballot, no voters
are eligible to vote after the polls close.'24 These voting standards
ought to be enforced in a way that reasonably prevents any voter
or group of voters from circumventing them or acquiring a special
right to wait and see whether their votes matter. 2' Furthermore,
differences between Florida counties in how election officials ap-
plied the state's overseas ballot standards meant that some voters
failed to have their late votes count, while other voters succeed-
ed' 26-an obvious departure from the Equal Protection principle
(2009).
119. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 108-11.
120. See Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92. To be clear, there were reports that a
small portion of late ballots were cast by voters who had not registered, had not requested
an absentee ballot, or may already have voted. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See Mazur, supra note 92, at 106, 130-31.
124. See Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92.
125. By 2008, when the outcome of the Minnesota senate race between Norm Coleman
and Al Franken turned on the validity of several categories of absentee ballots, Democratic
election lawyers had learned to make this argument without worrying that it would ap-
pear hostile to military or absentee voters. See Ned Foley & Steve Huefner, Appendix: Les-
sons from Minnesota 2008 and Beyond: Reforming the Absentee Voting Process, in AM. LAW
INST. PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION LAW: RESOLUTION OF ELECTION DISPUTES 87-88 (2012).
126. See Barstow & van Natta, supra note 92; Mazur, supra note 92, at 108.
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that the Supreme Court was about to articulate for state election
administration in Bush v. Gore.'27
It is impossible to determine what difference it would have
made to the final results of the 2000 Florida election if state elec-
tion officials had employed a strict standard of rejecting all over-
seas ballots that had not been cast by Election Day, or that did
not bear the required postmark.'28 It is clear, however, that Flori-
da's acceptance of late-arriving overseas ballots until ten days af-
ter Election Day did reverse the outcome of the presidential race.
But this story has several additional implications for purposes of
this article: (1) absentee and convenience voting measures must
be implemented in ways that also protect the essential integrity
of the election; (2) piecemeal efforts to increase turnout or im-
prove voting convenience can be problematic, as they may easily
beget unintended complexities; and (3) clarity is critical with re-
spect to ballot processing rules. Section IV will say a little more
about these lessons.
B. Virginia 2008
Virginia has a more recent story of UOCAVA difficulties in the
2008 presidential election. The story involves litigation over
whether a federal court should require the Commonwealth to
count late-arriving UOCAVA ballots in the face of a clear state
statute that required an absentee ballot to arrive by the close of
the polls in order to be counted.'29 This story, like the Florida sto-
ry, therefore also presents a conflict between strict and substan-
tial compliance with state voting rules, complicated by questions
of how to construe the requirements of federal law.
127. See 531 U.S. 98, 104-10 (2000).
128. The best effort to predict likely outcomes is from Professors Imai and King, who
conclude that it is unlikely, but not impossible, that some 680 invalid ballots altered the
outcome but that, in any event, the outcome would have been yet closer had these ballots
not been included and, therefore, at the least could have shaped additional arguments
about the Florida result. Imai & King, supra note 92, at 537-38, 542-45. In addition, one
recent Florida case suggested that when the number of wrongfully included absentee bal-
lots exceeded the margin of victory, but the votes on those ballots could no longer be specif-
ically ascertained and removed from the tallies, the remedy was to exclude all affected ab-
sentee ballots. See In re Protest of Election Returns & Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4, 1997
Election for Miami, 707 So. 2d 1170, 1172, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Barstow & van
Natta, supra note 92.
129. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-709(A) (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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Precisely because absentee ballots from overseas voters had
been essential to President Bush's victory in 2000 in Florida, the
McCain campaign in 2008 was closely monitoring whether swing
states were complying with their UOCAVA obligations to over-
seas and military voters. 3 ' The day before Election Day, the
McCain campaign filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that Virginia had violated
UOCAVA by failing to send absentee ballots to UOCAVA voters
sufficiently in advance of the election. 3' As relief, the campaign
asked the court to order Virginia to accept and count UOCAVA
ballots until the tenth day after the election, provided the ballots
had been cast on or before Election Day.
13 2
These late-arriving ballots, like their 2000 counterparts in
Florida, could have determined the outcome had the 2008 election
in Virginia been close. However, by the morning after Election
Day (less than two days after the lawsuit was filed), it was clear
that Obama's margin of victory was large enough that these bal-
lots would not be critical.'33 Nevertheless, the question of the va-
lidity of these ballots remained important, if only for precedential
reasons. The United States therefore intervened as an additional
plaintiff ten days after the election,"' relying on a UOCAVA pro-
vision that permits the United States (and only the United
States) to seek to enforce the statute3' (and thereby remedying
the fact that under the same UOCAVA provision the McCain
campaign actually lacked standing to seek enforcement of
UOCAVA rights).'36 Feeling no particular pressure to resolve the
lawsuit expeditiously, the court then considered the case for more
than two years, issuing its final order late in 2010."'
When this lawsuit began in 2008, UOCAVA did not impose a
specific date by which state election officials were required to
130. See United States v. Cunningham, No. 3:08cv709, 2009 WL 3350028, at *2 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 15, 2009).
131. Id.
132. Complaint at 10, Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028 (No. 3:08cv709).
133. See Andrea Stone, Election Alters Face of the South, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2008, at
6A.
134. Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028, at *2.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-4 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
136. The campaign eventually was dismissed from the suit, Order at 1, Cunningham,
2009 WL 3350028 (No. 3:08cv709), and the case was recaptioned United States v. Cun-
ningham. See Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028 at *3.
137. See Consent Decree at 1, 6, Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028 (No. 3:08CV709).
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transmit ballots and related voting materials to overseas and mil-
itary voters. Instead, it simply required that states "permit [mili-
tary and overseas voters] to vote by absentee ballot."'8 Both the
McCain campaign and the United States argued that, to be mean-
ingful, this provision obligated states to send ballots sufficiently
before the election to allow time for round-trip mail delivery to
remote military installations or overseas civilian addresses.' At
the time, there was a growing sense within the UOCAVA com-
munity that an adequate round-trip ballot transit time for typical
UOCAVA voters was more than one month and, ideally, perhaps
as much as two months."' Indeed, in advance of the 2008 election,
Virginia had committed to send UOCAVA ballots "no later than
45 days before [the election] .""
Nevertheless, less than thirty days before the November 2008
election a number of Virginia jurisdictions still had not sent ab-
sentee ballots to their UOCAVA voters."' Arguably as a result,
the ballots cast by at least some UOCAVA voters did not arrive
back in Virginia until after Election Day.' The McCain cam-
paign, aware that many UOCAVA ballots had not been returned
by the day before the election,'44 filed its suit in order to lay the
foundation for counting these voters' ballots later, should they
prove critical to the outcome.
145
By the time the federal district court issued its first substan-
tive opinion on the merits of the case in October 2009,146 Congress
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-l(a)(1) (2006).
139. See Complaint, supra note 132, at 4-7; Complaint in Intervention at 2-4, Cun-
ningham, 2009 WL 3350028 (No. 3:08cv709).
140. For example, as the complaint recited, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission,
the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense all were recommending that
states send out UOCAVA ballots at least forty-five days ahead of the election. See Com-
plaint, supra note 132, at 5-6. FVAP also was urging state legislatures to enact laws re-
quiring that ballots be mailed at least forty-five days before an election. See State Legisla-
tive Initiatives, FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.fvap.gov/reference/
laws/state-initiatives.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
141. VA. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, GUIDELINES FOR VOTERS THAT REQUEST E-MAIL
BALLOTS (2008), in Complaint, supra note 132, at ex. C; see VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-612
(Supp. 2012).
142. See Cunningham, 2009 WL 3530028, at *2.
143. See id. Other voters may even have given up, recognizing that they could not ex-
pect their voted ballot to reach Virginia by Election Day.
144. See Complaint, supra note 132, at 8-9.
145. See id. at 9-10.
146. See Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028.
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had almost completed the MOVE Act,147 whose most important
provisions would require all states to transmit UOCAVA ballots
at least forty-five days before an election.'48 The court concluded
that although UOCAVA had no such explicit requirement in
2008, the act implicitly required that states mail ballots reasona-
bly early, which the court held to be at least thirty days before an
election. 9 Concluding that Virginia had violated this require-
ment, the court ordered the Commonwealth to count all UOCAVA
ballots that had arrived within thirty days after the November
2008 election, if they had been cast before Election Day, and re-
vise the official results of the 2008 election accordingly."' The
court also tasked the parties with developing a permanent re-
sponse to the problem for future Virginia elections."'
Meanwhile, the McCain campaign's simple act of filing the suit,
coupled with the United States' intervention and substitution as
plaintiff in place of the campaign, brought additional attention to
the problem of states' late transmission of blank ballots. Indeed,
at the same time that the developing MOVE Act may have had
some impact on the district court's eventual judgment about how
much ballot transit time Virginia was obligated to provide, an in-
verse connection between Virginia's difficulties in 2008 and Con-
gress's 2009 action also is likely. Virginia's difficulties accommo-
dating UOCAVA voters, which the lawsuit helped bring to light,
were an example of the continuing struggles of military and over-
seas voters, which prompted Senator Schumer and other key pro-
ponents of the MOVE Act to take action."2
After the MOVE Act became law in late October 2009 (its key
provisions, including a forty-five-day advance transmission re-
quirement for UOCAVA ballots, took effect for the 2010 federal
147. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009); Remarks on Signing the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009 DAiLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 3 (Oct. 28,
2009) [hereinafter Remarks].
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-l(a)(8) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
149. Cunningham, 2009 WL 3350028, at *7.
150. Id. at *9. Although initially the McCain campaign, and then the United States, as
plaintiffs, had requested an order to count UOCAVA ballots received within ten days, by
the time of the court's merits decision the United States had amended its requested relief
to seek an order that all otherwise valid but late-arriving UOCAVA ballots be counted,
regardless of when they arrived. See id. at *3.
151. Id. at*11.
152. See 156 CONG. REC. S4513-15, S4517-18 (daily ed. May 27, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Charles E. Schumer) (detailing the "Background and Purpose of the MOVE Act" and
the "Section-by-Section Analysis of the Move Act").
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elections),'' the federal district court's demand that Virginia de-
velop a permanent solution was largely superfluous. As a result,
the final consent decree that the court issued in December 2010
consisted primarily of monitoring, training, and data collection
obligations, to remain in force through December 2012, which
would ensure Virginia's compliance with UOCAVA as amended
by the MOVE Act."' In the 2012 general election, Virginia appar-
ently met its obligations to transmit ballots to UOCAVA voters no
later than forty-five days before the election."'
Because the consent decree did not require Virginia to accept
UOCAVA ballots after Election Day,'56 it raised little of the con-
cerns about unlawful voting seen in Florida in 2000.57 But the
lawsuit did provide another illustration of the difficulty of getting
absentee ballots out to UOCAVA voters and back by Election
Day, as well as of the complexity of the interactions between state
and federal election law. Indeed, the MOVE Act's new federal
mandate requiring states to transmit UOCAVA ballots at least
forty-five days before an election' 5 -substantially earlier than
many states' election officials traditionally have been ready to do
so-does little to alleviate the tension between providing
UOCAVA voters sufficient time to vote and meeting the adminis-
trative burdens of running an election, including preparing bal-
lots and voting materials.
C. Ohio 2012
The most recent UOCAVA voting controversy occurred in Ohio,
another swing state in contemporary presidential elections. Alt-
hough Ohio's military population is not as large as either Flori-
da's or Virginia's,'59 nonetheless an even larger number of voters
were potentially affected by the Ohio controversy because at issue
were the voting rules applicable throughout the state to all non-
153. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009); Remarks, supra note 147, at 3.
154. See Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 2-5.
155. Cf. Scott Bauer, Romney Asks for Extension on Military Ballots; Election 2012,
WISC. STATE J., Oct. 3, 2012, at All.
156. See Consent Decree, supra note 137, at 2.
157. See supra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-l(a)(8) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
159. PROQUEST, LLC, PROQUEST STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2013,
at 347 (2013 ed., 2012).
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UOCAVA voters."' In July 2012, the Obama campaign-Obama
for America-filed a federal lawsuit against the Ohio secretary of
state, seeking on order that would grant to the state's regular
voters the same in-person early voting opportunities on the final
weekend before Election Day 2012 that the secretary of state had
made available to UOCAVA voters. 6' The lawsuit was quickly
characterized as an attack on military voting rights,' 2 with head-
lines or article titles that included "Obama Campaign Sues in Bid
to Suppress Military Vote"'63 and "Keeping the Military from Vot-
ing in Ohio."'64 In fact, the Obama campaign was not seeking to
limit military voting opportunities but, on the contrary, was rely-
ing on a convoluted confluence of state laws and regulations to
argue that non-UOCAVA voters should receive similarly broad
early voting options under the Equal Protection doctrine.
165
1. The Legal Terrain Prompting the Lawsuit
The essential background to the suit begins with the fact that,
from 2005 through 2010, Ohio's early voting law permitted coun-
ties to conduct early in-person voting through the weekend and
Monday immediately before Election Day.'66 In the 2008 presiden-
tial election, a number of Ohio counties, including Ohio's urban
centers, chose to do so, and as a result close to 100,000 Ohioans
voted during this three-day period. 67 But in June 2011, as part of
a sweeping election reform package dubbed House Bill 194, the
Ohio legislature amended the state election code to halt early vot-
ing at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before Election Day. 68 The prof-
160. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425-29 (6th Cir. 2012).
161. Complaint at 1-4, 19-20, Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-0636, 2012 WL
3765060 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012).
162. See Matthew Larotonda, Romney Says Obama Lawsuit Blocks Ohio Military Vot-
ers, ABC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2012, 8:20 PM), http://abcnews.go.comfblogs/politics/2012/08/rom
ney-says-obama-lawsuit-blocks-ohio-military-voters.
163. Todd Beamon, Obama Campaign Sues in Bid to Suppress Military Vote, NEWSMAX
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.newsmax.com/Headline/Ohio-military-vote-Democrats/2012/08/
03/id1447552.
164. Hans von Spakovsky, Keeping the Military from Voting in Ohio, THE FOUNDRY
(Aug. 6, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2012/08/06/keeping-the-military-from-vot
ing-in-ohio/.
165. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Obama for Am., 2012 WL
3765060 (No. 2:12cv00636).
166. Id. at 1-2.
167. Id. at 1.
168. Act of July 1, 2011, ch. -, 2011 Ohio Laws __, available at http://www.legisla
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fered reason for prohibiting early voting on the last three days
was to ease the burdens on election officials of making final prep-
arations for Election Day, including preparing up-to-date voter
lists for use at the polls.'69
Unfortunately, the legislative process by which Ohio reduced
the early voting period was not a model of clarity, particularly
with respect to the impact on the state's UOCAVA voters. The
original intent of the legislative majority that enacted House Bill
194 appears to have been to establish Friday at 6:00 p.m. as the
new deadline for all voters, including those covered by the state's
UOCAVA provisions. House Bill 194 did so by adding the Friday
6:00 p.m. deadline to the election code in two places, one pertain-
ing to UOCAVA voting7 ' and the other pertaining to regular early
voting. 7' The bill received no support from the Democratic minor-
ity in the legislature, however, because the final weekend of early
voting was understood to facilitate Democratic turnout efforts
and to favor Democratic candidates.'72 Accordingly, opponents of
House Bill 194 quickly began contemplating a popular referen-
dum to reverse its changes. "3
Almost immediately after the passage of House Bill 194, the
legislature realized that it had overlooked two other related sec-
tions of the existing code.' These sections, one for UOCAVA vot-
ers and one for all others, each specified the close of business on
the Monday before Election Day as the end of early voting, three
days later than House Bill 194's new Friday 6:00 p.m. dead-
lines. 7' The legislature recognized that it would need to pass a
corrections measure to eliminate these inconsistencies.'76 At the
time, the legislature was already working on House Bill 224, a
measure intended primarily to incorporate into Ohio law certain
expanded features of UMOVA, which the ULC had recently
ture.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_194_EN N.html.
169. See Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *5.
170. See H.R. 194, 129th G.A., Reg. Sess., sec. 1, § 3511.10 (Ohio 2011), available at
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB194ENN.html.
171. See id. § 3509.01(B)(3) (Ohio 2011).
172. See Jim Siegel, 2012 Referendum Effort: New Election Law Spurs Repeal Push,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 15, 2011, at 3B.
173. See id.
174. See Husted Upholds Rule on In-Person Early Voting, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Oct. 15, 2011, at B5.
175. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3509.03, 3511.02 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011).
176. See Husted Upholds Rule on In-Person Early Voting, supra note 174.
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promulgated.1 7  Because of its purpose to facilitate military and
overseas voting, House Bill 224 was receiving widespread biparti-
san support. 7 Without controversy, House Bill 224 also became a
vehicle to make "technical corrections" to the two code sections
overlooked in House Bill 194 in order to bring all of Ohio's statu-
tory deadlines for early voting into harmony at 6:00 p.m. on the
Friday before the election.1 79 The legislature then enacted House
Bill 224 in July 2011 with almost no opposition.8 '
Later in 2011, the signature-gathering effort to qualify the ear-
lier measure, House Bill 194, for a referendum succeeded, 8' ren-
dering its provisions ineffective at least until the outcome of the
referendum at the next general election, which would not occur
until November 2012. In May 2012, with this referendum looming
on the horizon, the Ohio legislature opted to repeal House Bill
194 outright,82 thereby avoiding the referendum entirely. Howev-
er, the legislature chose not to repeal the "technical corrections"
of House Bill 224 (which also were not a subject of the referen-
dum concerning House Bill 194)1" even though the corrections
had been adopted in order to complete the business of House Bill
194.
As a matter of Ohio statutory law, these events produced the
following state of affairs: (1) the two provisions enacted by House
Bill 224 now provided that early in-person voting would termi-
177. See H.R. 224, 129th G.A., Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Ohio 2011), available at http://www.
legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl291129 HB_224_ENN.html.
178. See Unofficial Votes for H.B. 224, OHIO GEN. ASSEMB., www.legislature.state.oh.
us/votes.cfm?ID=129 HB -224 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
179. H.R. 224, sec. 1, §§ 3509.03, 3511.02(C).
180. See Unofficial Votes for H.B. 224, supra note 178. Furthermore, House Bill 224
was passed as an "emergency" law, see id., a type of measure that under the Ohio Consti-
tution is not subject to popular referendum. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § id.
181. See Joe Hallett, HB 194 Foes Turn in Signatures; Petitions Signed by 300,000-Plus
Halt Election Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 2011, at IA; Press Release, Secretary
of State, Secretary of State Husted Certifies HB 194 Referendum Petition Signatures (Dec.
9, 2011), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/mediaCenter/201 1/2011 -12-09.aspx.
182. Act of May 8, 2012, ch. __, 2012 Ohio Laws.
183. Indeed, these provisions arguably could not have been subject to a referendum
because House Bill 224 was passed as an emergency law, see supra note 180, although
some ambiguity exists concerning whether House Bill 224 in its entirety was not subject to
the referendum process, or just sections 3 and 4, the only provisions of the act declared
within the text of House Bill 224 to be effective immediately as emergency measures. See
H.R. 224, sec. 4. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Obama for America v. Husted, among oth-
ers, claimed that the entire bill was not subject to the referendum process. See Complaint,
supra note 161, at 12 n.1.
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nate at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before Election Day, both for vot-
ers covered by Ohio's UOCAVA provisions"M and for all other vot-
ers;"8 5 (2) one pre-existing provision, which House Bill 194 would
have changed to impose the same Friday 6:00 p.m. early voting
deadline for regular voters, instead continued to provide merely
that early voting for regular voters shall begin thirty-five days be-
fore the election'86 but (absent the House Bill 194 amendment)
said nothing about when it ended; and (3) another preexisting
provision which House Bill 194 also would have changed to im-
pose a Friday 6:00 p.m. early voting deadline for UOCAVA voters
instead, by its terms, continued to permit in-person voting for
UOCAVA voters up through Election Day.'87 The two provisions
concerning regular voters (one from the law existing before House
Bill 194 and one from House Bill 224) were not in conflict, with
one provision establishing when early voting began and the other
establishing that it ended on the Friday before Election Day1s8
But the two provisions concerning UOCAVA voters (also one from
the law existing before House Bill 194 and one from House Bill
224) now conflicted with each other, setting inconsistent in-
person early voting deadlines for UOCAVA voters of either Elec-
tion Day or 6:00 p.m. the previous Friday.
89
To resolve this conflict, which the filing of the House Bill 194
referendum petition in September 2011 had created, the Ohio
secretary of state issued an advisory in October 2011 that in-
structed counties to continue to allow in-person early voting for
UOCAVA voters on the Saturday, Sunday, and Monday immedi-
ately before Election Day, notwithstanding the provision of House
Bill 224.19 The secretary of state thus chose to interpret the con-
flicting statutory provisions in a manner that protected the voting
opportunities of UOCAVA voters as broadly as possible. As for
184. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3511.02(C) (LexisNexis 2012).
185. Id. § 3509.03 (LexisNexis 2012).
186. Id. § 3509.01(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
187. Id. § 3511.10 (LexisNexis 2012).
188. Compare id. § 3509.01(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2012), with id. § 3509.03 (LexisNexis
2012).
189. Compare id. § 3511.10 (LexisNexis 2012), with id. § 3511.02(C) (LexisNexis 2012).
It may seem anomalous to describe in-person voting on Election Day as "early voting," and
indeed that is not the language of the statute. Instead, the provision at issue, section
3511.10, allows UOCAVA voters to appear in person at the local board of elections' office
anytime between the thirty-fifth day before Election Day through the close of the polls on
Election Day to vote an absent voter's ballot. Id. § 3511.10 (LexisNexis 2012).
190. JON HUSTED, OHIO SECY OF STATE, ADVISORY 2011-07, at 2 (Oct. 14, 2011).
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non-UOCAVA voters, for the first time in six years, Ohio's No-
vember 2011 general election was conducted without early in-
person voting on the three final days before the election.' It ap-
peared that the same state of affairs would govern the November
2012 presidential election.
2. The Lawsuit and Its Outcome
On July 17, 2012, Obama for America, along with the Demo-
cratic National Committee and the Ohio Democratic Party, filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
challenging the apparently unintended result of a complicated set
of state statutory changes, and its clarification through adminis-
trative directive, that permitted only the state's UOCAVA voters
to vote early, in-person, on the final three days before Election
Day.9 ' The Obama for America lawsuit alleged that excluding all
other voters from this early in-person voting violated the Equal
Protection Clause.9 As relief, Obama for America did not ask
that UOCAVA voters be denied the chance to vote on these days,
but instead sought an order restoring early voting for all Ohio
voters on the final three days.9
To the surprise of many informed observers, 9 ' the federal dis-
trict court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion,'96 and a Sixth Circuit panel quickly affirmed the district
court's decision.'97 The courts' responses were surprising to some
because it was settled law that states could offer special voting
accommodations for military and overseas voters without running
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, provided the states had a
sufficient basis for the distinctions in treatment. 9 Of course, any
Ohio voter covered by the state's peculiar early voting provisions
would have to appear in person at a board of elections location in
191. Id.
192. See Complaint, supra note 161, at 1-2.
193. See id. at 1, 17-19.
194. See id. at 20.
195. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Clear the Way for Early Voting in Ohio, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012, at A15.
196. Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *11.
197. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012).
198. See Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001); see also McDonald v. Bd. of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (holding generally that limiting absentee vot-
ing provisions only to certain classes of voters does not violate Equal Protection Clause).
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the three days immediately prior to Election Day in order to take
advantage of those provisions.199 In this respect, the voter would
not be the prototypical example of a UOCAVA voter, who usually
is voting in some remote location far from home. Nevertheless,
Ohio offered a sensible justification to the court for making this
accommodation only for UOCAVA voters: many of these voters
are sometimes mobilized and sent away from their home precinct
on very short notice, at which point their only voting option might
be to vote early in person before deploying.00
The district court specifically discounted this proffered justifi-
cation, however, largely on the basis that the secretary of state
had left to each local board of elections the discretion to decide
whether to conduct early in-person voting for UOCAVA voters on
the last Saturday and Sunday, when offices were not required to
have regular business hours.2"' This meant that Ohio law did not
in fact ensure that the military voters who might need this extra
voting opportunity, because of an abrupt deployment, would ac-
tually have it.20 2 The court also discounted the state's claim that
early in-person voting in the final three days before the election
would impose heavy burdens on local election officials.2 2
As for the plaintiffs' asserted injury to the right to vote, the
199. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.03 (LexisNexis 2012).
200. Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *5 (quoting Defendants' Memorandum Con-
tra Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13-14, Obama for Am., 2012 WL
3765060 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-0636)).
201. See id. at *5, *9. The district court also noted that the secretary of state had com-
pletely prohibited early voting for all voters on all of the other weekends in the early vot-
ing period, which further undermined the state's claim that military voters needed addi-
tional accommodations because of the potential for abrupt deployments. See id. at *5.
202. See id. at *9-10. Although it played no role in the court's analysis, or even in the
parties' arguments, it deserves mention that under UOCAVA a military voter must be
"absent" from the voter's voting jurisdiction in order to take advantage of UOCAVA pro-
tections. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(1) (2006). But UMOVA, by contrast, deliberately pro-
vides expanded coverage for all military voters on active duty (and their families), whether
or not they are absent from their voting jurisdiction. See UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS
VOTERS ACT, § 2(9), 13 U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2012); id. § 6, 13 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 2012). The pur-
pose of this expansion was to permit any military voters who were vulnerable to the possi-
bility of a sudden deployment to use the UMOVA voting process, even while at home, as
their default voting method, if they desired. In 2011, Ohio adopted this expanded UMOVA
definition as part of House Bill 224, Act of May 8, 2012, ch. __, 2012 Ohio Laws -
(amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3511.01). UMOVA thus offers another response to the
abrupt deployment problem that Ohio identified in defending its early voting system,
though it still requires covered voters to submit a federal write-in absentee ballot or re-
quest the state's military and overseas ballot before the state's regular absentee ballot re-
quest deadline.
203. See Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *10.
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court readily concluded that it was substantial, potentially affect-
ing thousands of disproportionately low-income and minority vot-
ers.2"4 The court determined that even the possibility that a few
UOCAVA voters might be able to participate in early voting,
when other voters could not, amounted to an Equal Protection vi-
olation.2"5 The court accordingly decided that, for purposes of early
in-person voting in the final three days before Election Day, all
Ohio voters had a constitutional right to participate in the voting
process on an equal basis and that Ohio lacked a sufficient justifi-
cation to restrict this right to only UOCAVA voters.2 6
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their Equal
Protection claim.2 7 The circuit court wrote that, had Ohio cut
back on early voting consistently for all voters, "its 'important
regulatory interests' would likely be sufficient to justify the re-
striction. ' ' The problem was that Ohio's new regime was not
uniformly applicable to all voters, and therefore the legal issue
became, under the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Burdick v.
Takushi, °9 whether the state had a "sufficiently 'important"' or
"weighty" interest "to excuse the discriminatory burden it has
placed on some but not all Ohio voters."'21 The circuit court, like
the district court, found no state interest sufficient to justify the
state's discriminatory treatment. 211 "While we readily acknow-
ledge the need to provide military voters more time to vote, we
see no corresponding justification for giving others less time. 212
As for remedy, however, the district court decision seemed to do
more than simply require Ohio to equalize (by leveling up) the
voting processes for all voters. On the court's own analysis,
providing equal treatment would merely have entailed requiring
all Ohio counties to provide to all voters whatever weekend early
voting, if any, each county chose to provide to UOCAVA voters.213
204. See id. at *7.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 10-11.
207. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 2012).
208. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
209. 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebreezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 & n.9
(1983)).
210. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 434, 436.
211. See id. at 436.
212. Id. at 435.
213. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-cv-0636, 2012 WL 3765060, at *9 (S.D.
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But the court's preliminary injunction appeared to require that
the secretary of state establish a uniform schedule of final week-
end voting hours for all voters across all counties.2 4 In providing
to all voters a broader early voting opportunity than the more
modest accommodations to UOCAVA voters that Ohio was actual-
ly providing before the lawsuit, the decision clearly was an effort
to echo the secretary of state's independently expressed commit-
ment to "level the playing field" across all counties and ensure
that Ohio voting is "uniform, accessible for all, fair, and secure. 215
The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district court's preliminary
injunction, read the remedy differently. Instead, it construed the
district court's remedial provisions to require only that, whatever
early in-person voting hours an individual Ohio county decided to
provide to UOCAVA voters, it must also provide them to all vot-
ers.2"6 "But the State is not affirmatively required to order the
boards to be open for early voting." '217 Nevertheless, when the U.S.
Supreme Court denied Ohio's motion for a stay of the circuit
court's decision ten days later,2 8 that same day the Ohio secretary
of state issued a directive setting uniform statewide hours for ear-
ly in-person voting for all voters on the three days prior to Elec-
tion Day: Saturday from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m.; Sunday from 1 p.m. to 5
p.m., and Monday from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m.2 19
The Obama campaign had successfully restored early in-person
voting on the final weekend before Election Day for all voters on
the basis of Ohio's unusual grant of that voting opportunity to
UOCAVA voters. The judicial outcome appears to be a first in re-
quiring equal treatment of both UOCAVA and non-UOCAVA vot-
ers with respect to a particular aspect of the voting process. The
decision thus inevitably invites more attention to the distinctions
Ohio Aug. 31, 2012).
214. See id. at*11.
215. See id. at *3, *11 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted).
216. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 437.
217. Id.
218. Husted v. Obama for Am., 568 U.S .... 133 S. Ct. 497, 497 (2012).
219. JON HUSTED, OHIO SEC'Y OF STATE, DIRECTIVE No. 2012-50 (Oct. 16, 2012).
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between these two categories of voters and to distinctions be-
tween the voting processes available to them, as discussed further
below."'
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN UOCAVA
VOTING
From the Civil War to the present, accommodations for mili-
tary voters have influenced the voting alternatives also available
to other voters. Not surprisingly, therefore, recent controversies
about UOCAVA voting offer lessons for contemporary voting pro-
cesses generally. They also confirm the continuing need to refine
state UOCAVA laws and further standardize the accommodations
offered to military and overseas voters, which the widespread
adoption of UMOVA would accomplish.
A. Connections Between UOCAVA Voting and Other Voting
Methods
Over the years, UOCAVA voters have received many accom-
modations, in both federal and state law, intended to facilitate
voting by a group of voters with unique voting challenges. Yet the
effort to find secure and effective ways to serve military voters of-
ten has inured to the benefit of other voters who do not face the
same challenges. General absentee voting of course received a
substantial boost from the successful experience with military
voting in the Civil War.22 Generations later, the need during
World War I and World War II to accommodate military voters
who were not only out of their home state but entirely out of the
country prompted additional accommodations,222 which eventually
enabled widespread absentee voting by civilian voters abroad. 3
Indeed, the UOCAVA itself is an interesting hybrid of accommo-
dations to assist both military and overseas civilians-two groups
of voters who share certain difficulties in voting but are not iden-
tically situated.224
220. See infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
224. In some ways the pairing of these two groups of voters may have helped maintain
bipartisan support for the set of accommodations that these voters receive collectively. To
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Today, both the MOVE Act and the UMOVA, which the ULC
has recommended for adoption by all states, seek to further assist
military and overseas voters by requiring states to use electronic
methods to speed the distribution of voting materials to these
voters, including unvoted absentee ballots.225 As election officials,
voters, the media, and other groups become more familiar with
these methods, it is likely that electronic transmission will also
become increasingly common for other categories of absentee vot-
ers even if electronic transmission of voted ballots remains con-
troversial. '26 Thus, a voting accommodation prompted by the criti-
cal need that UMOVA voters have more time to cast their
absentee ballots227 ultimately could also provide additional voting
convenience to all voters. Likewise, the use of a single postcard
application to enable UOCAVA voters to simultaneously register
to vote and request an absentee ballot is being promoted as an
innovation that should be available to all voters.'
The relationship between UOCAVA voting and traditional vot-
ing often runs in the opposite direction as well. For instance, with
the widespread adoption of the Australian ballot, ballot secrecy
became paramount for voting generally. 229 But protecting voter
privacy-as well as voter autonomy and independence-is much
more difficult for absentee voting than it is for polling place vot-
ing. Various witness and notarization requirements were there-
fore attached to absentee voting as it became more widespread.23
These requirements then were carried over to the processes used
for military and overseas voting as well, even though military and
overseas voters often have very limited access to a notary public
or a competent witness.23' Over time, the overseas and military
the extent that military voters, in an era of an all-volunteer military, are seen as more
likely, as a group, to favor conservative candidates and policies, while overseas civilian
voters, as a group, are seen as more likely to favor more progressive candidates and poli-
cies, support for measures like UOCAVA and UMOVA then need not be perceived as an
attempt to advantage one party or ideology. Of course, at bottom the hope remains that
most support for these measures results from the view that it is simply right to provide
meaningful assistance to both sets of voters.
225. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 76.
227. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
228. See Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat, Improved Absentee Balloting Processes Essential
to the "Fix," ELECTION L. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=
43992.
229. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
230. See FORTIER, supra note 16, at 10-11.
231. Cf. id. at 11. Some witness requirements provided that the witness must be a U.S.
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voting communities encountered enough difficulty with these re-
quirements that they successfully lobbied the ULC to replace
them in UMOVA with the requirement of a voter affirmation,
signed under penalty of perjury."'
Most of this cross-fertilization between UOCAVA voting and
traditional voting has resulted through simple borrowing or shar-
ing of administrative solutions among policymakers. In contrast,
the Obama for America litigation offers a dramatic departure
from this model, showcasing the use of judicial power, rather
than legislative or administrative policymaking, to mandate the
extension to all voters of an accommodation that the policymak-
ers had restricted to only UOCAVA voters.233 It thus raises ques-
tions about the limits of judicial power in overseeing policymak-
ers' efforts to accommodate military and overseas voters. Indeed,
to some, the Obama for America case is the proverbial camel's
nose, threatening to bring down the entire tent of accommoda-
tions designed specifically for UMOVA voters. This was the pri-
mary basis on which various military groups intervened in the
case to oppose the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion.2
34
But the case need not be seen as a threat to UOCAVA voting
for several reasons.23 First, centrally important to this use of ju-
dicial power was that both the federal district court and the Sixth
Circuit were heavily influenced by the fact that the relevant poli-
cymakers-the Ohio General Assembly-had from 2005 through
2010 allowed early in-person voting for all voters on the final
weekend and Monday before Election Day.236 The preliminary in-
citizen or even be a registered voter in the same state, a problematic requirement for
many military and overseas voters. See Matthew W. Potter, Confusion in Minnesota Sen-
ate Election: Could It Happen in Missouri, 65 J. Mo. B. 269, 302 (2009).
232. Section 4(e) of UMOVA requires each state's chief elections officer to prescribe a
declaration for the voter to sign, containing the same content as the declaration already in
use on the federal write-in absentee ballot. UNIF. MILITARY & OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT §
4(e), 13 U.L.A. 82 (Supp. 2012). In turn, the voter must sign the affirmation under penalty
of perjury. Id. § 13, 13 U.L.A. 88 (Supp. 2012).
233. See supra notes 195-219 and accompanying text.
234. See Brief of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants Military Group at 3, Obama for
Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-4076).
235. For further elaboration on these points, see Steven F. Huefner, Why the Ohio Ear-
ly Voting Case Is Not a Threat to UOCAVA Voting, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 89
(2013).
236. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 433 (citing League of Women Voters v. Brunner, 548
F.3d 463, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2008)); Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-cv-0636, 2012 WL
3765060, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012).
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junction was ordering Ohio to restore this early voting for all vot-
ers, not ordering Ohio to extend it to them for the first time .237 As
others have observed, the judicial response therefore implicitly
had something of a "non-retrogression" principle lurking in it. 3 '
With this background, the courts considering the Obama for
America case simply were not persuaded that the UOCAVA vot-
ers' needs for early in-person voting in the final three days were
sufficiently different from the needs of other voters to justify the
elimination of this early voting option for traditional voters but
not for UOCAVA voters.239 The courts also reached this result in
part because they concluded that the preferential treatment that
UOCAVA voters were receiving would not even reliably meet the
needs of those voters that Ohio had used to justify this treat-
ment24° and because they discounted the state's assertions about
the burdens of maintaining early voting for all voters. 4'
In these respects, the courts' weighing of the state's proffered
reasons for granting favorable treatment to UOCAVA voters
against the discriminatory burden of this treatment on other vot-
ers is likely sui generis."2 Courts will surely continue to uphold
favorable treatment for military and overseas voters when the ac-
commodations are demonstrably intended to respond to these
voters' particular needs. This is likely to be true even when the
237. ObamaforAm., 697 F.3d at 437.
238. See Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resur-
rection of Bush v. Gore, _ GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Edward B. Foley,
Non-Retrogression, Equal Protection, and Ohio's Early Voting Case, ELECTION LAW @
MORITZ (Sept. 6, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=96
73.
239. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 203 & 211 and accompanying text. The key fact here was that
Ohio had successfully conducted final weekend early voting for the six previous years. See
supra note 166 and accompanying text.
242. Even before the circuit court's decision, Ned Foley had deconstructed the sui gene-
ris nature of this case into discrete parts, none of which alone is sui generis, to argue that
as a matter of legal doctrine the resulting judicial outcome was by no means compelled.
See Edward B. Foley, Two Big Cases Ready for Major Appellate Rulings, ELECTION LAW @
MORITZ (Sept. 30, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=
9779; see also Edward B. Foley, Analyzing a "Voting Wars" Trifecta, Election Law @ Moritz
(Aug. 16, 2012), www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/freefair/index.php?ID=9579. But
likewise, the fact that the federal courts granted and sustained the preliminary injunction
on the basis that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on their Equal Protection
claim also does not compel (or even favor) the conclusion that in future cases, in which the
combination of factors in this case is lacking, an Equal Protection analysis will threaten
typical accommodations for UOCAVA voters.
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
burden on the state of extending similar accommodations to all
voters would be slight, as long as that burden is genuine.243
Accordingly, in the Obama for America case the courts them-
selves showed no interest in resolving the Equal Protection con-
cern by doing away with UOCAVA voters' early voting options in
a "leveling down" of the playing field.24 ' Instead, the courts
showed continuing solicitude for UOCAVA voters and for the
state's efforts to accommodate their needs, noting that the prelim-
inary injunction continued to offer military voters full access to
early voting.245 In principle, the decisions fully embraced the ap-
propriateness of special accommodations limited to UOCAVA vot-
ers when the state's proffered reasons for limiting their availabil-
ity were sufficient and those accommodations offered meaningful
assistance.
B. Broader Lessons for Absentee Voting and Early In-Person
Voting
The continuing effort to enhance the voting experience and op-
portunities of military and overseas voters is itself merely part of
a larger set of efforts to enhance the voting experience and oppor-
tunities of all voters. These efforts include increasing the availa-
bility of early in-person voting and permitting absentee balloting
by all voters who wish to use it, not just those who would be una-
ble to reach their traditional polling place on Election Day. As of
2012, thirty-two states had some form of early voting, and twen-
ty-seven states permitted any voter to cast an absentee ballot by
mail.246 This is a dramatic increase over the past decade.4 Mean-
243. As Michael Kang has argued, part of the problem that Ohio faced in defending its
early voting scheme was that the state's six-year history of successful early voting on the
final weekend undercut the claim that the reduction in early voting hours, for all but
UOCAVA voters, was intended to reduce the burdens on election officials. See Michael S.
Kang, Michael Kang Responds to Foley on Obama for America Early Voting Principle,
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Sept. 7, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/
index.php?ID=9689.
244. Cf. supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
245. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2012); Obama for
Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-cv-0636, 2012 WL 3765060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012).
246. See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept.
4, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-electionslelections/absentee-and-early-voting.as
px.
247. See Paul Gronke, Early Voting Reforms and American Elections, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 423, 423-24 (2008); Paul Gronke & Dan Tokaji, The Party Line, 10 ELECTION
L.J. 71, 71 (2011).
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while, at the same time that the number of states offering these
alternatives also has been increasing, the number of voters tak-
ing advantage of these alternatives to traditional voting has also
been on the rise in states where they are already offered.248
Do these nontraditional voting methods also actually increase
turnout and, in that sense, help to "Get Out the Vote?" Although
the UOCAVA clearly has been intended to increase the voting
participation rate of military and overseas voters, conventional
wisdom had become that neither early voting nor no-excuse ab-
sentee voting had much impact on general voter turnout.2 49 In-
stead, these measures were seen largely to enhance voter conven-
ience for essentially the same set of voters who would vote
anyway. But some recent studies offer preliminary indications
that at least the timing of early voting opportunities, and particu-
larly the inclusion of weekend voting, can affect turnout by ena-
bling certain voters to get to the polls more easily than on a work
day.25 Indeed, were this not at least perceived to be so, the parti-
san squabbling about early voting that occurred not only in
Ohio2 ' but also in Florida252 last year would surely not have been
so strong.
But even if nontraditional voting methods only increase the
convenience of voting, without expanding turnout, these
measures could offer one of the better solutions to the problems of
long lines at polling places on Election Day, problems that again
plagued some states this past year.5 Indeed, Ohio's extended pe-
248. See Michael P. McDonald, Early Voting in 2012: What to Expect,
HUFFINGTONPOST (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-p-mcdonald
early-voting-in-2012-what b_1773768.html; see also Michael P. McDonald, 2012 Early Vot-
ing Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2012), http://elections.gmu.edu/early_
vote_2012.html.
249. See, e.g., FORTIER, supra note 16, at 42-45 (summarizing several empirical stud-
ies).
250. See R. Michael Alvarez, Ines Levin & J. Andrew Sinclair, Making Voting Easier:
Convenience Voting in the 2008 Presidential Election, 65 POL. RES. Q. 248, 248 (2012); Mi-
chael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the
Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2012).
251. See supra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
252. See Democrats Sue to Extend Florida's Early Voting, THE CAUCUS BLOG, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com20l2/11/04/democrats-sue-to-ex
tend-floridas-early-voting/; see also Beth Fouhy, Florida County Extends Early Voting,
TEL. HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Nov. 5, 2012, at A6.
253. See Ethan Bronner, Long Lines, Demands for ID and Provisional Ballots Mar Vot-
ing for Some, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012, at P9; see also supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
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riod of early voting, which from 2005 through 2010 permitted vot-
ing on multiple weekends, not just the last weekend before Elec-
tion Day, was primarily a response to long lines at the polls in the
November 2004 election.254 One reason that early and absentee
voting methods have grown so dramatically is that election ad-
ministrators also have supported them as a means of reducing
the pressures on Election Day voting.255
However, the dramatic increases in nontraditional voting have
not always occurred with enough attention to the potential down-
sides of these methods or how to reduce those problems through
good design. Moreover, the dramatic increases in the use of these
methods make it even more important that these methods be fair
and structured to minimize errors and mistakes in the voting
process. Fortuitously, the recent controversies surrounding
UOCAVA voting methods help to illuminate key characteristics of
well-designed systems of non-traditional voting.
1. Downsides of Nontraditional Voting Methods-A Cautionary
Note
The potential benefits of nontraditional voting, whether only in
terms of increased convenience or also improved turnout, often
receive most of the attention, sometimes without careful balanc-
ing against the attendant risks or costs. Obviously, if a particular
method of nontraditional voting primarily offers increased con-
venience, but not increased turnout, its potential costs will loom
larger in the balance with its benefits. Accordingly, a brief note is
in order about the most significant costs of both absentee voting
and early voting, the two dominant methods of convenience vot-
ing. Each has its own set of downside issues.
Absentee voting has two main problems. First, in multiple re-
spects, it is much less secure than traditional polling place voting.
Because the voter casts the ballot away from the polling place
and the supervision of election officials, the ballot is no longer
necessarily secret. That simple fact begets opportunities for sev-
eral types of fraudulent absentee voting. First, absentee voters
can sell their votes by letting buyers observe (and even partici-
254. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2012).
255. See Lizette Alvarez, Court Approves Schedule for Florida Early Voting, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, at A16.
[Vol. 47:833
MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTING
pate in) the vote casting. Second, absentee voters, in the very
moment of voting, can by influenced or pressured to vote in par-
ticular ways by relatives, friends, work associates, religious lead-
ers, care-givers, and so on, depending on where the voter marks
the ballot. Third, absentee ballots can be intercepted by individu-
als other than the voters and cast on behalf of a voter who may
never be aware that this fraud has even occurred.
The second type of problem with absentee voting is that voter
mistakes, either in completing the absentee ballot return enve-
lope or in marking the ballot itself, can effectively disenfranchise
a voter. Ballot return envelopes that lack essential voter infor-
mation, whatever that is defined to include in a particular state,
will not be eligible to be counted unless the state has a mecha-
nism for the voter to cure the defect before the canvassing dead-
line (and the voter takes advantage of that mechanism).256 In con-
trast, a voter who goes to the polling place to vote runs none of
this risk of having the entire ballot ignored. Meanwhile, absentee
ballots on which a voter "overvotes," or mistakenly marks two
choices for a particular race, will not be counted for that race.
57
But when marking a ballot at a polling place, in-precinct ballot
scanners can alert the voter in real time to the overvote problem,
allowing the voter to void the mismarked ballot and complete a
new ballot.258 In-precinct ballot scanners also can alert voters who
mistakenly have neglected to vote in a particular race, thereby
avoiding the problem of unintentional "undervotes. '259 Absentee
balloting offers no protection against this error either. (Electronic
voting by touch screen, the other dominant mode of in-person vot-
ing, avoids both of these problems even sooner by prohibiting
overvoting entirely and by alerting the voter to unintentional un-
dervoting before the voter leaves the voting booth.)
Early in-person voting, because it occurs in a polling place,
thus, has neither of the categories of problems associated with
absentee voting. But it does have other costs. Logistically, it can
be more complicated for election officials to manage than absen-
tee balloting because it requires staffing voting locations for days,
256. See The Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 118, at 132.
257. See, e.g., Carlos Ilescas, "Overvote" Means No Vote in Race, DENVER POST, Nov. 1,
2012, at 2A.
258. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Val-
ues, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2005).
259. See id.
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if not weeks, rather than only on Election Day.26° In some jurisdic-
tions, extensive early voting using existing election facilities and
staff may actually save money,261 but in other locations, it may re-
quire additional paid staff.26 To the extent that disparities in the
costs of early voting--or differences in any other logistical factors
or other considerations-give rise to disparities in the availability
of early voting around a state, Equal Protection concerns or fair-
ness problems may arise. Finally, by definition early voting,
whether in-person or absentee, means that not all voters are de-
ciding on the basis of the same set of facts, as late-breaking in-
formation cannot influence the votes of those who have already
cast an in-person ballot or mailed an absentee ballot. The further
in advance early voting is available, the greater the risk that
some voters will cast ballots on the basis of what the voters them-
selves might subsequently regret was incomplete information.
2. General Principles Applicable to All Forms of Convenience
Voting
The preceding cautionary notes suggest several essential com-
ponents of well-designed convenience voting systems, as do some
of the key lessons highlighted by recent UOCAVA voting contro-
versies. Some of these lessons are particular to a given type of
system, but others have more universal application. For instance,
when subjected to intense pressure in 2000, Florida's UOCAVA
voting system was managed in ways that did not properly protect
the essential integrity of the election, as described in Section II
above.262 One significant contributing factor was the lack of clarity
and consistency in the state's rules for processing late-arriving
ballots, which in turn was the unintended result of the somewhat
piecemeal way in which the state's process for accommodating
UOCAVA voters had come together.264 Any voting system should
work to avoid these kinds of problems.
To that end, any system of convenience voting should honor at
least these essential principles:
260. See Paul Gronke, Early Voting Is a Crucial Fix, but It's Not Flawless, in A Better
Way to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at SR3.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See supra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 98-108.
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(1) the system must be designed to preserve and enhance fair-
ness to all voters, including ensuring that its processes lend
themselves to consistency in application and that state and feder-
al requirements mesh seamlessly;
(2) the system should be structured to minimize post-election
issues, shifting as many discretionary decisions by judges, elec-
tion officials, or other administrators as possible to the pre-
election stage, before outcomes are known;
(3) voting rules should be simple, clear, and established well in
advance (and also widely shared in advance) in order to further
minimize post-election litigation and controversy, as well as to
further maximize consistency in application; and
(4) the system must be both reliable and perceived as reliable.
Of course, operationalizing these principles in a specific state
election system may be easier said than done. Even a system that
appears well designed on paper may in fact prove difficult to ad-
minister reliably. In part, that was the lesson of Virginia's 2008
difficulties in transmitting UOCAVA ballots before the MOVE
Act's forty-five-day deadline: the Commonwealth simply failed to
meet its obligations, prompting the McCain campaign to seek pro-
active relief. '65 But another lesson of Virginia's 2008 difficulties is
that our hybrid election system, in which new federal law re-
quirements often are grafted upon long-standing state law re-
quirements and cultures, can create undesirable complexities
that may thwart effective implementation, at least for a time.
Understanding the interconnections between state and federal
law, both in theory and in practice, thus becomes a critical com-
ponent of sound system design.
3. Principles of Sound Early In-Person Voting
In addition to the preceding general principles, several more
concrete principles should apply specifically to early in-person
voting:
265. See Complaint at 7, United States v. Cunningham, No. 3:08cv709 (E.D. Va. Nov. 3,
2008). The McCain campaign's decision to file suit concerning this failure before Election
Day could itself be characterized as a type of effort to avoid post-election litigation, raising
issues before the nature of those claims reflects the unofficial outcomes.
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(1) early-voting hours should be meaningful, convenient, and
well-publicized;
(2) an early-voting period should not extend too far before Elec-
tion Day but should include at least one full weekend;66
(3) early-voting locations should be inviting, convenient, and
well-publicized;
(4) early-voting options should be uniform throughout the state
(smaller jurisdictions may need some flexibility-or some state
assistance-in identifying or staffing early-voting locations, but
all voters should have comparable opportunities to participate);
(5) voting equipment and processes used for early voting should
be identical to those used in the jurisdiction on Election Day and
should permit correction of overvotes and undervotes; and
(6) results of early voting must not be tallied before the close of
polls on Election Day.
The final two principles should be uncontroversial, but some
brief observations are in order about the first four principles. The
specific number of days and hours of meaningful early voting
could differ in different states, based on population densities,
economic conditions, and cultural factors. In urban centers, early
voting locations should be near public transportation or otherwise
readily accessible. With these location-specific factors in mind,
early voting must be designed to offer meaningful alternatives to
the difficulties that some voters may have in voting on Election
Day. In order to enhance both public awareness and fairness to
voters, whatever early voting is established should be uniform
throughout the state, clearly communicated, and stable over time.
While the same period of early voting may not make sense for a
presidential election as for an entirely municipal election, in the
long-term it is desirable that the early-voting period for a presi-
dential election be generally consistent across presidential elec-
tions.
266. A ten-day period, starting two Saturdays before Election Day, offers one good ap-
proach.
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4. Principles of Sound No-Excuse Absentee Voting
Several different principles also should apply specifically to ab-
sentee voting:
(1) required paperwork, transmission envelopes, and other pro-
cesses should be simple, understandable, and voter friendly in or-
der to minimize uncountable ballots;
(2) the submission process must include some mechanism to
guard against voting an absentee ballot after Election Day;
(3) the submission process must include some mechanism to
guard against selling absentee votes, voting under duress, and
other types of fraudulent voting;
(4) absentee ballots should be processed centrally at county
boards of elections (or municipal boards of elections in those few
states that administer elections at the municipal level), rather
than at the precinct level, in order to increase the uniformity with
which they are reviewed (and in any event, the standards for pro-
cessing absentee ballots must, as described as a general principle
above, be clear and settled in advance);
(5) absentee voters should receive notice of defects concerning
their ballot transmission envelopes that affect the eligibility of
their ballot and should have the opportunity to correct these de-
fects during the time that the state is also processing provisional
ballots in those situations in which correction is possible; and
(6) because of the greater risks of fraud and mistake in absen-
tee voting, states should prefer the establishment of meaningful
early in-person voting opportunities over no-excuse absentee vot-
ing; a state with meaningful early in-person voting should limit
its absentee voting to only those voters who are not able to take
advantage of early in-person voting or regular Election Day vot-
ing.
A particular clarification is in order regarding the second and
third principles. With respect to the second principle, one obvious
way of ensuring that an absentee ballot has not been voted after
Election Day is to require that the ballot be received by Election
Day. This is a sensible requirement for ballots not coming from
overseas. But until the overseas transmission of ballots and bal-
loting materials becomes faster, an Election Day deadline may be
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
too soon for UOCAVA voters. A postmark on or before Election
Day would also be acceptable and, in theory, would permit both
domestic and overseas absentee voters to cast their ballot a little
closer to Election Day than would a requirement that election of-
ficials must receive the voted ballot by Election Day. But the
UOCAVA community remains concerned that, although in theory
all military mail should receive a postmark at some point in its
processing, in a small portion of cases the postmarking may not
occur for several days after the mail has been placed into the mil-
itary mail system and, therefore, may not accurately reflect when
the ballot was voted.267 Accordingly, for UOCAVA voters, the vot-
er's affirmation under penalty of perjury ought to be acceptable.
With respect to the third principle, a similar approach could
suffice: require the voter to affirm under penalty of perjury that
the ballot accurately reflects the voter's own uncoerced, unbought
preferences. Especially for UOCAVA voters, as previously de-
scribed this is substantially more voter friendly than requiring a
notary public to witness the ballot.26 Many states already no
longer require either notarization or witnessing of absentee bal-
lots for non-UOCAVA voters as well.269
C. UMOVA's Potential Contributions
As described in Section II above, America's initial responses to
the voting challenges facing military personnel occurred at the
state level.27° With time, Congress also became involved (though it
could do so only with respect to elections for federal office).27' To-
day, the result of Congress's persistent interest over many dec-
ades is UOCAVA as amended by the MOVE Act.272 Yet difficulties
persist for military and overseas voters.
UOCAVA voting difficulties persist in part because elections
continue to be conducted at the state level, and voting procedures
vary widely across states. These state differences have made it
harder for various groups and individuals, including the FVAP,
267. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, UOCAVA VOTERS AND THE
ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION OF VOTING MATERIAL IN FouR STATES 17 (2007).
268. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., The Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 118, at 131-32.
270. See supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text.
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military voting assistance offices, voting assistance officers, state
department officials, and non-governmental organizations, to
help individual voters navigate the particular requirements ap-
plicable to them individually.273 In addition, the federal overlay on
state election administration adds complexity and increases the
risk of problems, as evidenced in some way by each of the three
controversies described in Section III above.
As of this writing, no data were yet available concerning mili-
tary and overseas voter participation rates in the 2012 presiden-
tial election. Additional empirical research about the impact of
the federal MOVE Act, as well as of various state adoptions of a
UMOVA equivalent, is certainly in order. But even without
awaiting that additional data, the need to continue refining the
voting process for military and overseas voters seems clear. For
instance, the latest round of complaints about these voting pro-
cesses included the refrain that the Department of Defense was
not adequately helping military personnel.274 Of course, if state
laws were clear and uniform, the need for this assistance would
be substantially reduced. Increased standardization thus remains
a central need.
Though additional congressional action may at first glance
seem an obvious way to achieve greater national uniformity, at
least for federal elections, the reality is that even for these elec-
tions, the processes of election administration are likely to remain
primarily a state function. It therefore may be more appropriate
to respond to the continuing difficulties facing military and over-
seas voters once again primarily through state laws, if they can
promote uniformity. UMOVA would do just that, while also har-
monizing with the current federal regime of required assistance
for military and overseas voters.
If widely adopted, UMOVA not only would standardize the way
in which states assist military and overseas voters in federal elec-
tions, in compliance with the federal MOVE Act and UOCAVA,
but also would guarantee similar accommodations for state and
273. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
274. In large part this was a complaint that the Department had yet to establish many
of the voting assistance offices mandated by the MOVE Act, which were intended to be a
more reliable and accessible source of assistance than the voting assistance officers that
had been required under UOCAVA before the MOVE Act. See supra note 6.
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local elections.275 It also would cover broader categories of both
military voters and overseas voters.7 6 And it would give affected
voters a right to seek injunctive relief to enforce the act's provi-
sions.277 UMOVA represents the collective judgment of the hun-
dreds of members of the ULC, assisted by a number of interest
groups and observers, and has been approved by the American
Bar Association.7 It deserves widespread adoption around the
country.
V. CONCLUSION
In the ongoing effort to improve our processes of conducting
elections, one important value continues to be to provide in-
creased access and convenience-not only for military personnel
and overseas civilians but also for all voters. But increased access
must remain fair, and increased convenience must remain secure.
The history of improvements in military and overseas voting is a
testament to the ability of thoughtful policymakers to develop
creative and meaningful solutions to the particular difficulties
faced by these voters. Some of these innovations also have appro-
priately found wider application to other voters, and cross-
fertilizations will continue to occur. However, states and Con-
gress must pay close attention to the costs, as well as the bene-
fits, of various nontraditional voting methods. Recent controver-
sies surrounding military and overseas voting demonstrate the
importance, among other key characteristics, of clear voting rules
established in advance, which are attuned to the complexities of
our hybrid system. Careful attention to these fundamental prin-
ciples can make voting more convenient and accessible for all vot-
ers, while also keeping the processes of democratic governance
fair and reliable.
275. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
277. UNIF. MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT, § 18, 13 U.L.A. 90-91 (Supp. 2012).
278. See Military and Overseas Voters Act, supra note 8.
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